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3
Introduction
Beginning with Muhammad’s forceful consolidation of Arabia in 631 CE, the
Rashidun and Umayyad Caliphates completed a series of conquests that would later
become a hallmark of the early Islamic empire. Following the Prophet’s death, the
Rashidun Caliphate (632-661) engulfed the Levant in the north, North Africa from Egypt
to Tunisia in the west, and the Iranian plateau in the east. Following the end of the
Rashidun, the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750) also racked up extensive military victories.
In the early eighth century, this empire expanded further and attained control of the
Caucasus, Transoxiana, Sindh, the Maghreb, and the notable Iberian Peninsula.1 With
these additions, the Islamic state emerged as one of the largest empires in the pre-modern
world, with a population of over thirty million people, overwhelmingly non-Muslim.2
Now under Muslim control, these newly conquered non-Muslim communities brought
with them an array of religious traditions including Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism,
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Animism.
During this period, the majority of people saw religion as the largest aspect of an
individual’s identity. For many individuals, their identity was derived primarily from
their religion as it dictated an individual’s morals, daily behavior, and understanding of
the world. The importance of religion in relation to identity is demonstrated by how texts
from the seventh and eighth century refer to settled populations within a city by their
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religion. Rather than using social status or ethnicity in order to classify people, authors
perceived population as consisting of different religious groups. As a result, in many
texts, local people were referred to as the Jews or the Christians of a specific city or
region and were governed based on these groups. While the distinction between nonMuslims will be covered in depth later, Christians and Jews were regularly mentioned
because they are the People of the Book (ahl al-kitab) and therefore were afforded higher
regard than other religious faiths.3 With religion taking center stage, the state could not
depend on their mere presence to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of the people since
the average person had few inherent ties to the state, particularly in regards to their
identity.4
Based on this understanding, the challenge that the Islamic empire faced would
have been considerable. As representatives of the newest religion in the Mediterranean in
the seventh and eighth century, Muslim conquerors had to both subdue the local
populations and get them to accept an administration that had a different understanding of
the world. From its foundation, religion was interwoven into the empire’s politics and
culture. Two classic examples of this inherent link is Muhammad’s rule and the Muslim
community’s choice of rulers or caliphs after the Prophet’s death. After the Hijra to
Medina in 622 CE, Muhammad became the head of an emerging state while maintaining
his position as the leader of a religious community known as the Community of Believers
or the umma.5 As the final prophet of God, Muhammad established himself as both the
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religious and political leader of the Muslim community. Following the death of the
Prophet in 632 CE, and as the latter had not designated a successor, a dispute emerged
within the Muslim community on who should be the caliph. One portion of the Muslim
community thought that caliph needed to be a member of the Holy Family which meant
having a direct familial relationship to the Prophet.6 On the other hand, many believed
that the new ruler only needed to be a qualified member of the Community of Believers,
preferably a close associate of the Prophet from his tribe, the Quraysh of Mecca.7 Among
other reasons, this debate was significant because Muhammad’s death occurred shortly
after his consolidation of the Arabian tribes. From the perspective of some of these tribes,
since they created pacts with Muhammad, they believed themselves released from their
agreements after his death.8 Thus, in order to keep this young empire together, it was
extremely important that the caliph was legitimate in the eyes of his Muslim subjects both
religiously and politically. As history shows, neither sides’ option, Ali or Abu Bakr, were
able to garner complete legitimacy with the Muslim community. This ultimately helped
lead to the division of the Shia and Sunni sects that is seen in Islam today.9
As the young religious community and the Islamic state emerged hand in hand,
inseparable from one another, the Muslim conquerors in the seventh and eighth centuries
had to tackle the challenge of legitimizing their rule in the eyes of their predominantly
non-Muslim subjects. According to Richard Bulliet, Muslims only consisted of 5-6% of
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the population in Islamic territories in 720 CE.10 This made it particularly important for
the Islamic empire to be seen as legitimate by their new citizens as there was always fear
of revolt following a period of conquest. Faced with this framework, the Rashidun and
the Umayyad Caliphates knew they needed to legitimize their rule using a variety of
tactics both during and following their conquests. Ultimately, these tactics, which will
also be referred to as legitimacy practices, facilitated the integration and assimilation of
non-Muslims into the Islamic empire. In turn, this integration was important because it
was a key feature in helping create the multifaceted, long lasting Muslim empire that
scholars know today.
Historiography
Although surrender agreements have existed for hundreds of years, there has been
limited research dedicated solely to their study. By and large, scholars of Islamic history
have delved into many different aspects of the early Islamic conquests, the Rashidun
caliphate, and the Umayyad empire. Examples of the most investigated topics include the
empire’s military and political history as seen in Gerald R. Hawting’s book The First
Dynasty of Islam: the Umayyad caliphate AD 661-750 and Fred Donner’s Early Islamic
Conquests. Additionally, historians have also investigated more concentrated topics such
as non-Muslims, siyar (Islamic international law), relations between Muslims and
dhimmis, and early conversion to Islam. However, due to the many aspects of early
Islamic life, historians have not been able to give every topic the attention it requires. As
a result, surrender agreements as a specific aspect of the history of non-Muslims along
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with the formation of the concept of dhimmi and the treatment of non-Muslims in dar alIslam (Abode of Islam) have not been paid enough attention. Thankfully, over the last
fifty years, research has continued to evolve as scholars work to develop a more accurate
and cohesive picture of this time period.
In recent years, this new picture has come more into focus thanks to the work of a
number of scholars. In regards to surrender agreements, one of the most significant
among these individuals is Milka Levy-Rubin and her book Non-Muslims in the Early
Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence. Unlike most authors before her, LevyRubin dedicated her entire work to these agreements. This decision allowed her to
demonstrate a comprehensive understanding of their ancient lineage, their characteristics,
their evolution, and the procedures they followed. One of the most valuable features of
her book is how Levy-Rubin includes an array of primary source examples of surrender
agreements.11 Recorded by medieval historians, these examples are what authors and
their informants said was written in the agreements based on what they saw or reports
they heard. While these sources present their own problems, Levy-Rubin is able to make
much of this documentation accessible to readers by including English translations of
these agreements in her book and giving them historical context.12 For all its positives, it
is worthwhile to mention that Levy-Rubin was not able to cover every aspect of surrender
agreements. The goal of this paper then is to build upon Levy-Rubin’s work and add
some fresh remarks specifically in regard to the impact of these surrender agreements on
the integration of non-Muslims.
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Despite the skill of modern historians, there are a number of inevitable issues that
occur when studying seventh and eighth century surrender agreements. The first of these
problems is the fact that the documentation that has survived is typically a record of the
historian’s informants who were not always direct witnesses of the events surrounding an
agreement or the agreement itself. Furthermore, it is extremely rare that a copy of an
agreement survived. This fact forced historians to write their records based on what their
informants and oral tradition remembered. Moreover, modern scholars usually get their
information about these agreements from medieval historians who were writing period
summaries decades after they occurred. Unlike today, this practice was not uncommon as
later historians frequently wrote the history of earlier periods in Islamic history. Wellknown examples of historians like this are ʾAḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-Balādhurī, Abū Jaʿfar
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī, and Abū'l-Ḥusayn Hilāl b. Muḥassin b. Ibrahīm alṢābi'.13
Traditionally, these historians were not tremendously concerned about ensuring
the accuracy of events they recorded. Moreover, like all historians, these individuals had
a purpose for writing and their motivation effected how they portrayed events.14 One
example of this can be seen in Levy-Rubin’s work when she briefly mentions the claims
by A. Noth who believed that many reports, particularly those on the conquest of Egypt
and Iraq, did not originate at the time of the conquest and instead were written later to fit
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Umayyad political agendas.15 While this claim was made by a single author, Levy-Rubin
states that it is of course possible that specific reports were modified later to support
personal interests. While there is no guarantee that Noth is correct, the manner in which
Levy-Rubin responded to his claims showcase how frequently historians manipulated
history.
Beyond the limited unreliability of these initial recorders, this documentation was
also subject to numerous translations as it traveled from location to location. Over time, a
single piece of evidence could be translated, interpreted, and copied countless times by
different readers. Each time these changes occurred, there was a chance that the newly
translated or copied document conveyed a slightly different message than the original.
Even if a translator did his best work, there are some phrases and/or meanings in every
language that cannot be translated verbatim. In addition, in historical documents, types of
contractual settlements are also referred to as pacts and treaties. While there is no way of
knowing for sure if these two terms refer to surrender agreements or if they maintain the
same definition in each source, the context of the document can be used to help define its
meaning.
Despite these recording issues, additional research on surrender agreements is still
valuable. As with most documentation, even if scholars do not have a complete record of
the original document, there is still much that can be learned from what did survive. By
studying these agreement fragments, it is clear that the early Islamic empire was able to
gain legitimacy by utilizing surrender agreements. Part of an ancient practice, these
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agreements created a social framework by defining and regulating the relationship
between different religious traditions and Muslims. As a result, surrender agreements
offer a window into the developing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in dar
al-Islam as the latter was expanding. In addition, they shed considerable light on the
evolving conceptualization of non-Muslims’ place in dar al-Islam from the point of view
of Islamic legal tradition and political theory. By defining this relationship in a
framework that was agreed on by all parties and one that preserved the basic rights of
non-Muslims, these agreements were remarkably effective in facilitating the acceptance
and incorporation of non-Muslims into Muslim society.16 Using this background, it is
clear that the original, actual surrender agreements, concluded upon the Muslim conquest,
contributed to non-Muslims’ integration into the early Islamic caliphate by defining nonMuslims’ social, political, and legal status in relation to Muslims in dar al-Islam.
Typically separated into two phases, both the early, original surrender agreements
concluded at the time of the conquest, and the later version of surrender agreements that
claimed to be “authentic”, formed the basis of the legal, juristic articulation of the
evolving status of dhimmis in the Abode of Islam as a part of the development of Islamic
international law (siyar).17
Surrender Agreements
Emerging in the early seventh century, Islam was established by the Prophet
Muhammad based on revelations believed to be God’s words and communicated to the
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Prophet by Archangel Gabriel. After his visit with Gabriel, Muhammad introduced Islam
as a universalist, Abrahamic religion in the city of Mecca.18 As a major trading city in the
Arabian peninsula, Muhammad’s location, his place in the Quraysh tribe, his persona,
and his marriage to Khadija, a wealthy business woman, all aided him in gathering his
first followers.19 In addition, while Islam was distinctly different from the idolatry that
dominated Arabia, its similarities to Judaism and Christianity were familiar. As Judaism
and Christianity had already established a long-term presence in the Arabian Peninsula,
they were well-known there.20 As a result, when Muhammad began preaching about a
new faith, the people of Mecca would have had an understanding of Islam’s basic
principles based on the religious context that was available in the region.21 Thus, while in
Mecca, Muhammad was able to gain a following and establish Islam as the newest
Abrahamic religion.
Although the people of Mecca knew of the Abrahamic religions, there were many
individuals who were not accepting of Islam. This in addition to political strife forced
Muhammad and his followers to move to Medina in 622 CE in a migration known as the
Hijra. Originally invited to Medina as a mediator, it is here Muhammad would become
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the political leader of the umma as Islam transformed from only a religion to a political
entity bound by religious ties.22 Linked to this change was the fact that Islam was
becoming a religion of conquest as Muhammad and his followers engaged in military
conflicts with the Meccans and Jewish tribes in Medina.23 The Prophet also continued his
practice of forming alliances with nomadic tribes using of pacts.24 Eventually, through
military and diplomatic means, Muhammad would unite the tribes of Arabia under his
control, setting the stage for the early Islamic conquests.
Throughout these early years of Islam, the concept of jihad emerged based on the
words and military actions of Muhammad as well as the words of the Qur’an. At this
time, jihad referred to the ability for Muslims to wage justifiable war against an enemy in
defense of Islam.25 Seen as a collective obligation rather than an individual one, the aim
of jihad was to defend, and at times expand, the Islamic state. Importantly, jihad was not
allowed to be used to convert non-Muslims to Islam if they surrendered peacefully to the
Muslim conquerors and thus earned dhimmi status. For Muslims, this obligation
contributed to their understanding of how the world was divided. On one side, there is the
Abode of Islam or dar al-Islam which is the land under the control of an Islamic state and
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it is governed according to Sharia (Islamic law). In contrast, there is the Abode of War or
dar al-harb which is the locations not governed by Sharia law and thus filled with
unbelievers who are perceived to be potential enemies.26 In theory then, the ultimate goal
of jihad is to continue the struggle against dar al-harb until the world is dar al-Islam,
leaving no potential threats to the state.
In addition to this ideal, another feature of jihad was that it was governed by a set
of rules including ones that prohibited harming those who were not engaged in combat.27
Moreover, the Qur’an addressed when Muslims could perform jihad and when they could
not. In verse 4:90, the text states, “Therefore if they withdraw from you but fight you not,
and (instead) send you (Guarantees of) peace, then Allah Hath opened no way for you (to
war against them).”28 Based on this record, it is clear that the Qur’an outlines rules for
those that can be waged war on. In addition, it is interesting that those who wish to make
peace are protected by the Qur’an since this sura would prevent pious Muslims from
entering into armed conflict with individuals who desired peace. However, since the text
does not elaborate further, there is not enough evidence, solely on the basis of this sura,
to determine what this “guarantee of peace” is referring to or its significance.
Following Muhammad’s consolidation of Arabia in the seventh century, the
Islamic state launched into a period of rapid expansion. During this period, Muslim
conquerors participated in two types of conquest: sulkhan and anwatan.29 The first refers
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to conquest through a binding agreement or sulh while the second is conquest by force.30
The difference between these two forms of conquest was significant because they had a
lasting role in how non-Muslims in these cities were treated both legally and socially. For
cities taken using anwatan, the Muslim conquerors were permitted to do as they pleased
with the conquered populations. This was largely because there was not sulh that created
a legal agreement between the two parties.
On the other hand, for cities conquered using sulkhan, a legally binding
agreement was in place that defined the relation between Muslims and non-Muslims.31
While this will be discussed more in depth later, an individual’s religious tradition and
their relation with the conquerors determined how this agreement would affect them.
Thus, an agreement is going to impact an individual who is considered dhimmi and
Christian differently than an individual who is not dhimmi and Manichaean. In addition,
there were different types of contractual agreements beyond surrender agreements that
non-Muslims entered into. Not considered a surrender agreement, one good example of a
different type of agreement is the one made with the Nubians in the mid-seventh century.
According to Al-Tabari’s history, the governor of Egypt, ‘Abdallah b. Sa’d b. Abi
Sarh, established a peace treaty with the Nubians following a huge military defeat due to
the Nubian’s superior bowmanship.32 For the Nubians, this treaty required that they offer
the Muslims a gift of a number of people to be used as a labor force. In exchange, every
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year, the Muslims would give them specific foodstuffs and garments. Based on alTabari’s record, ‘Abdallah b. Sa’d b. Abi Sarh and the governors and commanders who
lived after him honored this agreement, largely out of concern for the well-being of the
Muslims.33 From this example, it is clear that there were various types of sulh (including
surrender agreements) that varied based on the local circumstances. In addition, this
example demonstrates the importance of these agreements for both the conquered and
conquerors as it sets in place a binding legal agreement that is honored by tradition and
Islamic law.34
During their conquests, Muslim military leaders utilized a number of instruments
of legitimization as they worked their way across the known world. Among these tactics,
one of the most established was the use of surrender agreements. In her book NonMuslims in the Early Islamic Empire: From Surrender to Coexistence, Milka Levy-Rubin
offers a quality account of what these agreements entailed. According to Levy-Rubin, at
their core, surrender agreements were a promise of security given by Muslim invaders in
exchange for payment, typically the poll-tax (jizya) or some other form of tribute, by the
conquered population.35 Besides its financial purpose, the payment of jizya by dhimmi
served as a physical representation and recognition of the Muslims’ rule, as well as a way
to “humble” non-Muslims, as prescribed in the Qur’an (9:29).36 The security given in
exchange for this payment consisted of the civilians’ lives, their property, and their right
to continue living according to their ancestral laws without Muslim interference.37 As the
33
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foundation of all surrender agreements, this exchange was written into most agreements
from the conquests along with details regarding the payment of jizya which was usually
paid using coin, material goods, or services to Muslims. Examples of possible payment
methods included horses, hides, armor, military assistance, or acting as a guide for
Muslims. Due to their simple nature and few obligations, these surrender agreements did
not impose burdensome restrictions on the lives of non-Muslims and left them in relative
peace to continue their lives undisturbed.
In addition to their simplicity, there was also a specific procedure that Muslim
conquerors followed when establishing an agreement. Upon approaching a new
settlement, Muslim military leaders would send a member of their force with an offer of
peace.38 Otherwise faced with war, representatives of the population would parley with
the general of the Islamic force and agree to surrender if certain conditions were fulfilled.
Negotiations between the two would take place and the document had to be ratified by
the sovereign body of each side. After an agreement was reached, the documents would
be signed, witnessed, and sealed. Often written in two languages, a copy of the document
was given to both parties for future reference.39 Normally, a surrender agreement lasted
for a set amount of time or until the death of one of the representatives or their sovereign
leader after which the pact needed to be renewed.
The practice of both parties getting a copy is significant because it allowed
surrendered populations to hold Muslims legally accountable if the terms of the
agreement were broken. Interestingly, many of the records scholars have of early
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surrender agreements come from this type of use as historians mention town leaders
referring to their copy during a local dispute or renewal. One great example of this is how
in the late seventh century, the people of the city of Tuflis brought their copy of their
agreement to al-Jarrah b. ʿAbdallah al-Hakami who took over governorship of the region
of Khurasan following the accession of Umar II.40 Originally signed by Habıb b.
Maslama, the new governor renewed Tuflis’ agreement using the local population’s
original copy.41
In regards to non-Muslims, it is important to understand that the Islamic caliphate
defined and categorized non-Muslims for legal and administrative purposes. Typically, an
individual was labelled both by their religious belief and their relationship related to
Muslims in terms of Islamic law. For the latter, there were usually three groups that a
person could fall into: dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma), “people of the armistice” (ahl alhudna), or “people who received guarantee of safety” (ahl al-aman). Known as protected
people, dhimmis were non-Muslims who agreed to live under Islamic rule and received
permanent protection from Muslims. The people of the armistice were those who were
not under Islamic rule, were not living in Islamic lands, and their only requirement was to
not war against the Muslims. Finally, the people who receive a guarantee of safety are
those who stay in Muslim territory temporarily and do not pay jizya such as merchants,
envoys, and traders.42
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In addition, a person is also categorized by their religious belief. Generally called
infidels, common religious groups included Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, polytheists,
and heretics who were typically associated with the Manichaeans and the Samaritans.
These labels can overlap since, for example, a person can be a Jew and a dhimmi.43
Overall, these categories are extremely significant because the Islamic empire used them
in their legal and administrative institutions. Since surrender agreements were an
integral part of these institutions, these categories were also used in agreement documents
in relations to a specific town or region’s non-Muslims. For non-Muslims, these groups
were how the empire determined an individual’s rights and obligations since the laws
were recorded based on these categories. In addition, an individual’s classification
dictated their relationship with Muslims and other religious groups.
For example, in the book Tolerance and Coercion in Islam, the text states, “Umar
b. al-Khattab did not take jizya from the Zoroastrians of Hajar until he was told by Abd
al-Rahman b. Awf that the Prophet has levied it from the Zoroastrians of Hajar and
enjoined the Muslims to treat them as they would treat People of the Book44.”45 This
excerpt demonstrates that individuals were recognize in Islamic law and administration
based on two labels: their religion and their relationship related to Muslims. Knowing
these categories was extremely important because, as one can see, different religious
groups were granted different rights and held to different obligations. In addition, this
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example shows that Muslims, in this case Umar b. al-Khattab, was careful to honor the
recorded rights’ of these groups due to their legal and administrative significance.
According to Islamic law, surrender agreements were considered to be legally
binding documents and were treated as such by the Muslim authorities.46 A good
demonstration of this is a dispute recorded by Ibn al-Mu’alla who reported that he read a
document written by the qadi of Damascus, Yahya b. Hamza.47 In this document, the
qadi reports how the Christians of the city came to him, claiming the Muslims had taken
over their churches and asked him to fulfill the agreement made with them by Khalid b.
al-Walid. After reviewing the agreement they produced and the jizya, the qadi sided with
the Christians, ruling the Muslims needed to return the property or compensate them
adequately.48 This record and those like it are enlightening because they demonstrate how
these agreements functioned first and foremost as a protection of dhimmi’s rights
including personal property and religious freedom. In fact, according to Levy-Rubin,
from the late eighth century onwards, “…these agreements often seemed an
encroachment upon the rights of the Muslims. Nevertheless, they were respected by the
Muslim authorities.”49 Interestingly, this idea is in direct contrast to how most traditional
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narratives have depicted the Islamic empire. In the minds of many, the Islamic empire
was characterized by religious oppression and the stifling of local populations. As these
surrender agreements help demonstrate, this narrative is not accurate as local populations
were entitled to religious freedom and the right to practice even from the earliest days of
the empire.
In regards to surrender agreements, it is important to note that there were many
different variations of these agreements. While there was a uniform structure to them,
their purpose for the empire was multifaceted and needed to fit the circumstances of each
population.50 By negotiating with the conquered, these agreement secured a swift victory
for the empire, established the conquerors’ relationship with the local population, built a
daily social framework, and legitimized their rule. On the other hand, these agreements
helped conquered populations ensure the continuation of their daily lives and their
livelihoods. Depending on the background of that region or town, this continuation took
slightly different forms. Thus, in order to create an agreement that was acceptable for
both sides, the content of these documents needed to be malleable depending on the
population’s needs.
The basic pattern of surrender agreements in the age of the Islamic conquests was
set as early as in the time of the Prophet Muhammad, when the Muslims, under the
leadership of the Prophet himself, were consolidating their control over the Arabian
Peninsula. Reported by al-Baladhuri, a good example of this is the surrender agreement
made in 631 CE by the city of Najran.51 Located in southwest Arabia, Najran consisted of
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Christians and Jews who made an agreement with representatives of Muhammad.
Allegedly orchestrated by two monks, this document is similar in nature to other
surrender agreements that would come later on during the conquest. This similarity is
primarily due to the fact that this agreement was simple, outlining the exchange of a
yearly tax and acceptance of Muslim rule in exchange for the promise of protection. For
the Jews and Christians of Najran, this deal was significant because it guaranteed that
they would be left alone if they fulfilled a few very specific conditions.52
The most in depth portion of the document explains how Najarn would pay the
jizya. In this case, this city of Jews and Christians had to provide two thousand robes
annually to the Muslims and provide visiting Muslims lodging. In addition, in the event
of war with al-Yaman, the city was required to loan the Muslims thirty coats of mail
along with thirty horses and camels each.53 It is interesting that these later materials were
given as a loan, not a tribute, and that Muhammad guaranteed that the Muslims would
return them. Not common in later agreements, the presence of loaning in this document
supports that idea that this agreement was created in the early days of the Islamic state,
particularly since Muhammad did not have the equipment he needed to outfit his soldiers.
Overall, this agreement is a good example of how Jews and Christians were incorporated
into the Islamic state using surrender agreements from the empire’s very beginning.
During the conquests, the form in which jizya was paid by non-Muslims was
flexible. This adaptability allowed a conquered population to negotiate with their Muslim
conquerors in order to find a type of payment that they could provide. Oftentimes, this
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modified payment was material goods or services that was equal in value to a currency
amount.54 A good example of this flexibility was in the mid-seventh century when Ibn
Amir, governor of Basra, accepted male and female slaves in place of having residents
pay the poll tax.55 This stipulation was written into the agreements of a few towns across
the Oxus in consideration of the fact that their resources and property were in material
goods and not in physical currency.
Interestingly, adjustments made to jizya was not only due to necessity or an
unavoidable need like it most likely was in Basra. At times, it was prompted by a custom
found in a specific town or a shared desire among townspeople. One clear example of this
was the surrender agreement of Barkah (Barca) in east Libya.56 Created in the 640s, the
military leader ‘Amr ibn-al-‘Asi agreed to allow the local Berbers to sell some of their
children in order to pay the tribute. According to the surviving record, this stipulation was
not imposed on them and, in the past, the Berbers had send the children they wanted to
sell to the governor of Egypt without any urging.57 Overall, this was a local custom that
the Berbers desired to continue and, rather than demand payment in dinars, the Muslim
conquerors permitted it.
In addition to Barkah, another example of a desired, optional change can be found
in the surrender agreement of the city of Darband (northeast Iran). In their agreement, the
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local population asked that their tribute be in military assistance rather than the payment
of the jizya (the poll-tax). This is because, in the townspeople’s perspective, paying this
tax was considered humiliating and military aid was vastly preferable.58 Though not a
necessary change, the Muslims acceded to this request and wrote it into their legally
binding agreement with Darband.
While the adaptability of these agreements might seem insignificant, this feature
was extremely important to the success of surrender agreements. Being able to
personalize these documents meant that the Muslim conquerors could modify an
agreement until it was acceptable for the local, non-Muslim population.59 This in turn
ensured that the conquerors could achieve a relatively short victory over a large area that
included numerous towns. Without the ability to adapt to cultural characteristics and
considerations, it is unlikely that non-Muslims would have accepted these agreements to
the degree that they did. In addition, the ability to modify these documents from location
to location inevitably created a variety of diverse agreements across the Middle East.60
Although this will be discussed in depth later, this diversity would create frustration and
upset among the Muslim population during the ninth century and would eventually be
used as a reason to standardize these agreements into one. To provide an cohesive
picture, at the end of this paper, illustration one conveys the locations of surrender
agreements (or treaties) where the texts of these documents have been cited in written
record. As the image shows, there is evidence of agreements spanning from Egypt to
Iran.
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As time went on, the basic pattern of surrender agreements would persist.
Appearing well into the late stages of the Islamic conquests, this exchange of protection
and relative independence for the payment of jizya can be seen in the conquest of Iberia
in the 710s. Translated by Olivia R. Constable, the Treaty of Tudmir is one specific
example of the persistence of this basic structure.61 Dated to 713 CE, this document was
established between ‘Abd al-Aziz and Theodemir who was the local ruler of Murcia.
Though brokered by Theodemir of Murcia, the agreement states that this document also
applied to seven other towns in the area: Orihuela, Valentilla, Alicante, Mula, Bigastro,
Ello, and Lorca. Relatively short, this translated document focuses extensively on
outlining the services that the conquered would and would not have to complete. Specific
stipulations that are mentioned include not removing Theodemir from power, not burning
the town’s churches, and not coercing non-Muslims in matters of religion. In exchange,
the conquered were required to not shelter fugitives, not encourage any protected people
to fear the Muslims, and to abide by the agreement. Besides these aspects, the document
also stated that each of Theodemir’s men had to pay one dinar per year along with four
measures of wheat, barley, fruit juice, vinegar, honey, and olive oil.62
Based on this translation, the Treaty of Tudmir is a typical surrender agreement.
In both content and structure, this document appears to abide by the basic pattern and
traditions established by the Romans centuries prior. In particular, it features protection
and the promise to leave non-Muslims alone in exchange for the payment of taxes in the
form of dinars and material goods. This tax was the subject that was explained in the
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most detail and thus was most likely a point of serious negotiation between the two sides.
In this context, this intense debate makes sense because, in the eyes of the conquered, the
amount and type of tax would need to be something they could reasonably fulfill every
year. In addition, since this agreement was made on the behalf of eight towns, this
tradition also assisted the Muslims by granting them a quick conquest over a large area.
One interesting aspect of this agreement was the inclusion of the stipulation that the
conquered could not encourage any protected people to fear the Muslims.63 The addition
of this stipulation signals that the Muslims were interested and invested in preventing
strife in these new territories. Furthermore, by asking others not to fear them, this
agreement supports the idea that the Islamic empire was using these documents to
integrate non-Muslims into dar al-Islam.
While all these examples were relatively straightforward, there were more
complex surrender agreements, such as the multi-phase surrender in Alexandria in the
640s. In order to understand the intricacy of this agreement, one can refer to The
Chronicle of John (c. 690) Coptic Bishop of Nikiu in which John of Nikiu (a Coptic
Bishop of Nikiu in the Nile Delta) recorded what he knew of the agreements of
Alexandria. According to this source, in the early seventh century, the Melkite patriarch
Cyrus of Alexandria travelled to Babylon (at Modern Old Cairo) which was serving as
the headquarters of the Muslim army in Egypt. There, he negotiated a treaty with the
Muslims in 641 CE on behalf of Egypt.64 Unfortunately for Cyrus, not everyone in
Alexandria was happy that he made a legally binding agreement on their behalf. The
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Diophysites of Alexandria were particularly upset with this occurrence. On the other
hand, the Copts of the city welcomed it.65 This anger on the part of the Diophysites was
why Cyrus was almost stoned to death after arriving back in Alexandria. Eventually,
though, the city surrendered to the Muslims’ rule. However, a problem arose when the
Byzantine emperor sent a general Manuil (Manuwil) who re-conquered the city for
Byzantium.66 Sometime in the mid-640s, however, Alexandria surrendered again to the
Muslims and agreed to pay jizya in exchange for dhimmi status for the non-Muslims in
the city.
In regards to the actual terms of the agreement, the second treaty outlined a fixed
amount of tribute, the removal of Roman (Byzantine) troops from Alexandria, and the
release of 150 soldiers and fifty civilians.67 In exchange, the Muslims agreed not to seize
Christian churches, allowed Jews to stay in Alexandria, and to not intervene in the
concerns of Christians. The record goes on to report that Cyrus was almost stoned to
death by the people of Alexandria after the Muslims came for their tribute. According to
the author, since the Alexandrians did not know about the agreement and could not fight
off the Muslims, they planned to punish Cyrus instead. Fortunately, Cyrus was able to
persuade them to his side and the Alexandrians felt ashamed of what they were going to
do. In addition, after the initial treaty was made, Cyrus was tasked by his fellow
Egyptians to negotiate with the Muslims once again. Driven out of their homes by fear,
the Egyptians wanted the Muslims to promise to allow them to return to their cities and
65
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become Muslim subjects. Once Cyrus accomplished this, the Muslims allegedly had
control of all of Egypt.68
In this document, there is evidence that agreements were flexible in order to fit
the demands of each city and region. The best instance of this is when the Egyptians
asked for the conquerors’ promise that they could move back into their cities. This was
significant because the Muslim conquerors agreed to give them back their land and to
grant them the right to private and public property after they had abandon their city. If the
land was not given back to the locals, this property could have been used for Muslims
settlers or taken as booty. Thus, this concession on the part of the Muslims demonstrates
their desire to integrate non-Muslims into their society by ensuring non-Muslims were
present and relatively content with their daily circumstances.
In addition, the record does not mention anything about the civilians or the
Roman military bucking the Muslims’ authority following the treaty even though Cyrus
secured this treaty without their consent. After being on the brink of war, this easy
acceptance of a foreign power after learning about the treaty lends support to the belief
that these agreements were grounded in Roman tradition.69 In addition, it is interesting
that Cyrus was serving as a representative and negotiator for all the religious
communities residing in Alexandra and not just the Melikites to whom he belonged.
While this follows the established procedure of these agreements, other religious
communities, like the Jews and the Monophysites, were held legally responsible for the
terms that Cyrus agreed on, no matter if these obligations were sensible or not. The fact
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that other groups were held to the obligations that a member of another religious
community agreed on, could create issues and contributed to why Cyrus was going to be
stoned to death.70 During this period, the threat of punishment initiated by public opinion
acted as a safeguard against unfair or unsupported agreements. In Cyrus’ case, the
Melkite of Alexandra did not agree with their patriarch about surrendering to the
Muslims and thus, they attempted to impose public punishment on Cyrus.
For the Islamic empire, surrender agreements played a central role in building
legitimacy and facilitating non-Muslim integration. By creating a written agreement in
which both the conquerors and conquered negotiated terms, Muslim rulers were able to
gain legitimacy right off the bat as populations willingly entered into these agreements in
exchange for protection. In addition, these surrender agreements set the social status,
rights, and legal obligations of non-Muslims in their new Muslim communities. These
clearly defined parameters helped non-Muslims integrate into a Muslim dominated
society.
Moreover, these agreements provided a sense of continuation for non-Muslims
who were facing a rapidly growing empire that was distinctly different from those that
had come before. From the beginning, most of the people in the caliphate were nonMuslims who, under Islamic rule, were dominated by a religious, political, and military
superior Muslim minority as Muslims gradually moved into previously non-Muslim
cities. By the mid tenth century, Muslims would constitute the majority of the population
in dar al-Islam.71 However, this was not the case during the first few centuries of Islamic
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rule. For many, the practice of surrender agreements was reassuring since this type of
agreement had been present in the Mediterranean since the Classical era.
The Evolution of Surrender Agreements
According to Levy-Rubin’s work, evidence of surrender agreements can be found
on the Arabian Peninsula since the time of Muhammad.72 However, their basic principles
are rooted in an ancient diplomatic tradition originating around the middle of the second
millennium BCE in the ancient Near East.73 The tradition of surrender agreements along
with their corresponding procedure was passed down over the centuries until it was
firmly established in the public’s memory and history. In fact, according to Levy-Rubin,
it was highly likely that the adoption of surrender agreements as a mechanism for
surrender and a lasting social and legal institution was initiated by the conquered
populations.74 This initiation was due to the fact that these populations had functioned
according to agreements like these for centuries under the Byzantine empire. As a result,
they desired to continue the tradition of surrender agreements because of their historical
context and their ability to let locals carry on with their lives relatively undisturbed. This
background facilitated the acceptance of this ancient practice by the Muslims conquerors
shortly following the beginning of the conquests.75
There is ample evidence of Byzantine treaties in the historical record. One useful
example of this is a treaty signed in 505 AD after several years of war. According to the
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chronicle of Marcellinus Comes, a treaty was established through the work of two
traveling envoys, Celer and Armonius.76 This agreement brought an end to the war by
deciding that the Sasanians would give the city of Amida to the Byzantines in exchange
for one thousand pounds of gold. By studying these treaties, it is evident that this practice
was ongoing based on the similarities in terminology and structure between the original
Roman agreements and these Byzantine treaties.77
Although rooted in Roman tradition, surrender agreements in the Islamic empire
underwent two distinct phases. The first phase was the time period during which
surrender agreements were in their original, relatively untouched state. During this phase,
the Muslim conquerors were taking control of lands such as Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and
Iran, and were concluding agreements with the conquered non-Muslims who accepted
Muslim protection and became dhimmis. These genuine surrender agreements were
usually detailed but also generally minimalistic with respect to the restrictions they
imposed on the conquered non-Muslims.78 As seen in the Treaty of Tudmir, the detail in
these agreements were centered around the annual taxes that the conquered non-Muslims
had to pay.79 Otherwise, these surrender agreements do not impose burdensome
restrictions on the lives of non-Muslims, generally leaving them to live in peace. These
initial documents were constructed in this manner because the Muslim conquerors were
few in numbers and thus, a tiny minority in the newly conquered lands.80 As a result, they
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were content being recognized as the Muslim elite by the conquered populations, living
well, and collecting taxes from non-Muslims.
In addition to Muslims’ low numbers, they were also willing to accept such
simple agreements because the vast majority of Muslims living in these new territories
did not actually live together with non-Muslims. Instead, in the early decades following
the initial conquest of an area, Muslims lived in amsar or garrison towns which were
built separate from established non-Muslims towns.81 In the minds of Muslims, these
amsar were necessary since they were superior to the conquered and thus they should not
“mix” with them.82 Gradually, however, the two sides began to intermingle as Muslim
conquerors and their progeny would stop serving as soldiers and start taking up trades. In
addition, Muslims began intermarrying with non-Muslim women or mawali (local nonArab converts to Islam). Over time, residents of amsar moved into areas heavily
populated with non-Muslims while non-Muslims started infiltrating amsar. Interestingly,
it is this intermixing in cities and towns that caused non-Muslims to appear to have too
many rights as Muslims began to constantly compared themselves to their non-Muslim
neighbors.83
Phase two was generated by Muslims’ upset with the liberal conditions nonMuslims were granted in the initial surrender agreements. As the number of Muslims rose
in these territories (due to immigration, the conversion of non-Muslims, and the stability
of the caliphate), these liberal rights became intolerable for Muslims.84 In the eyes of this
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group, being Muslim gave them an inherent superiority over people of other religions and
ethnicities, particularly in the public sphere.85 By the eighth and ninth centuries, Muslims
believed that their superiority was guaranteed by the Qur’an and the major tenets of
Islamic law and political theory. As a result, their status needed to be seen and reflected
in the happenings of daily life. However, the reason that it was not, was all thanks to the
initial agreements.
Revealed by Muslims’ dissatisfaction, it is at this point that the historical
conditions had clearly changed. It was apparent that what had worked for the conquering
Muslims during the initial conquests started appearing inappropriate for the politically
and militarily dominant Muslims several generations later. With the centralization of the
Abbasid state, there appeared the perceived need to come up with some sort of standard
rules and regulations for dhimmis in order to satisfy the empire’s Muslim population. As
a result, Muslim jurists in the late eighth and ninth centuries started thinking about how to
change the regulations for dhimmis so that they reflected their “humble” social and
political standing.86 However, due to the legally binding nature of the initial agreements,
the regulations for dhimmis could not be changed without making the Muslims look as if
they were reneging on their own surrender agreements from the early days of the
conquests.87
In order to get around this little problem, Muslims jurists decided to start
proposing new regulations under the disguise of "ancient surrender agreements". They
did this by presenting new strict regulations as “ancient traditions” that were part of the
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early, original surrender agreements. Allegedly forgotten or lost, since these harsh
stipulations were part of the original agreements, the jurists were able to legally justify
“reintroducing” them. Though this argument was completely bogus, jurists declared that
dhimmis had broken the initial stipulations as spelled out in the original surrender
agreements and therefore they now needed tougher regulation. As one would expect,
these “ancient” stipulations used questionable evidence to back up their claims such as
unreliable Hadith reports.88 Another justification jurists gave for stricter, standardized
regulations was the diverse array of surrender agreements that existed.89 Since each town
could have a slightly different agreement based on their circumstances, it could be
difficult for Muslims to keep these agreements straight and fueled their outrage at the
freedoms of non-Muslims.
As a result of these developments, various competing agreements arose, each of
which worked to standardized and strengthen dhimmi regulations. Chief among these,
was the Shurut Umar (Pact of Umar). Although originally written around 800 CE, this
“agreement” and its long list of strict restrictions were passed off as being part of an
original surrender agreement from the time of the conquest.90 In fact, jurists attributed the
formation of this document to caliph ‘Umar I during his rule from 634 CE to 644 CE.91
By crediting ‘Umar I with creating this agreement, Muslim jurists were able to add
credence and historical context to their claim that this document was part of the early
agreements. Ultimately, the Shurut Umar (Pact of Umar) won out as the empire’s
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canonized agreement and its regulations became the ones that all dhimmis now had to
abide by under Islamic law.92
Although disguised as authentic, legal obligations, at their core, the Shurut
Umar’s new regulations were meant to humble the non-Muslims who lived in cities with
Muslims. In order to accomplish this, these obligations were designed to visibly
showcase Muslims’ social and political superiority over non-Muslims.93 According to alTurtushi’s translated version of the document, stipulations included not bearing any kind
of arms, not building houses taller than Muslim houses, not imitating Muslims in speech,
and rising from their seats when Muslims wanted to sit.94 In addition, non-Muslims were
banned from building new places of worship, wearing personal attire similar to Muslim
attire, using transportation animals like horses, and restricted on how and when they
could publicly practice their faith.95 As one can see, compared to the true, early
agreements, these additions seriously restricted the lives of non-Muslims in both the
public and the private sphere.
In fact, these stipulations had larger implications than just what non-Muslims
could wear on a daily basis. Although these obligations were not enforced to the same
degree everywhere in the empire, their introduction was felt sharply. For example, if nonMuslims could not use horses, it would have been extremely difficult to travel outside a
small area. In addition, a non-Muslim could not work in numerous professions like being
a trader or a merchant if he could not use a horse. Another far reaching consequence of
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these obligations is the changes it would prompt in non-Muslim religious practices. For
instance, since adherents could not conduct processions on Palm Sunday and Easter, how
this celebration was observed each year had to be significantly altered to meet Islamic
stipulations.96 This impact holds true when one considers the fact that non-Muslims were
also not able to raise their voices in church, use clappers except at a very soft volume, or
bury their dead near Muslims just to name a few of these new obligations. Overall, the
Shurut Umar had a significant, long lasting impact on the lives of non-Muslims by
revoking many of their previous rights.
Based on this explanation, it is clear that the surrender agreements, their
stipulations, and how they facilitate integration had a significant impact on the social and
political structure of the empire. From the caliph to the a non-Muslim farmer, the impact
of these agreements influenced daily life. For the common people, they determined how
one behaved, dressed, worshiped, and worked. On the other side, these agreements ran
the empire’s administration by allowing them to set up a structure based on the collection
of non-Muslim taxes. Additionally, when these agreements were not honored, people
noticed and it was viable fuel to help spark one of the various rebellions that emerged
during the Umayyad Caliphate. Overall, there is evidence that, at least initially, Muslim
conquerors were purposefully using surrender agreements to help integrate non-Muslims.
Conclusion
By utilizing surrender agreements, the Islamic empire was able to gain much
needed legitimacy and facilitate the integration of non-Muslims from their conquered
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territories into their newly established society. Rooted in Roman tradition, these early
documents were straightforward in nature, simply exchanging the promise of protection
and relative independence on the part of the Muslims for the payment of jizya by nonMuslims. In general, these original surrender agreements did not impose many
restrictions on the lives of the conquered non-Muslims and allowed them to continue on
with their regular lives relatively undisturbed. This paired with their adaptable nature
made surrender agreement an ideal tool to promote non-Muslim integration into the
Islamic caliphate.
In addition, surrender agreements established the initial dhimmi status of the
conquered and outline their relationship with the Muslim conquerors. By doing this, these
documents created a social and legal framework in which a new Muslim society could be
established and gradually develop. Furthermore, since they were legally binding, nonMuslims could ensure that Muslims preserved their rights throughout the centuries and
vice versa. Over time, these agreements were incorporated into siyar and understood to
be a piece of genuine Islamic law.
While the surrender agreements made during the Islamic conquests clearly
facilitated non-Muslim integration, the same cannot be said for the Shurut Umar.
Although marketed as an “ancient agreement’, this document was not a part of the
agreements established during the conquests. In addition, the Shurut Umar was an
essential component of Muslims’ quest to limit the rights of non-Muslims in the late
eighth and early ninth centuries. Eventually incorporated into Islamic law, this document
standardized surrender agreements in the Islamic empire and greatly limited non-Muslims
freedoms in an effort to reinforce Muslim superiority. Due to these restrictions, the
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Shurut Umar was not meant to aid non-Muslims integration as the empire moved beyond
this objective in the early ninth century.
Although there are issues with seventh and eighth century research, additional
work will help unveil the mysteries of surrender agreements and push other scholars to
carry on researching this subject. As historians know, it will take constant, thorough
research to confirm with certainty that all the assertations in this paper are correct across
all geographic regions. Thankfully, it is possible that other scholars can continue this
research and push surrender agreements into the limelight. So, although more research
needs to be done, it is clear that early surrender agreements contributed to non-Muslims’
integration into the early Islamic caliphate.
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Illustration 1. Map of the locations of surrender treaties and vassal treaties (only where the actual text of
the treaty is cited).
Citation: Levy-Rubin, Milka. Non-Muslims in the Early Islamic Empire : From Surrender to
Coexistence. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 46.
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Illustration 2. This is a map of the Islamic empire at the end of the Umayyad Caliphate in 750 CE. Dark green
represents the Prophet Muhammad’s consolidation, medium green is the Rashidun’s conquests, and light green depicts
the Umayyad’s conquests.
Citation: Khan, Syed Muhammad. “Umayyad Dynasty.” Ancient History Encyclopedia. Ancient History
Encyclopedia, April 9, 2020. https://www.ancient.eu/Umayyad_Dynasty/.
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Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads. Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1994.
Blankinship, Khalid Yahya. “Parity of Muslim and Western Concepts of Just War.” The
Muslim World 101, no. 3 (2011): 412–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14781913.2011.01384.x.
Bosworth, C. E., ‘The Concept of Dhimma in Early Islam’, in B. Braudeand B. Lewis,
eds., Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, New York 1982, pp. 37–51.
Bulliet, Richard W. 2013. Conversion to islam in the medieval period. Cambridge:
Harvard Univ Press.
Carlson, Thomas A. 2015. "Contours of Conversion: The Geography of Islamization in

42
Syria, 600-1500". Journal of the American Oriental Society. 135 (4): 791-816.
Cook, David. Understanding Jihad. Berkley, CA: University Of California Press, 2015.
Crone, Patricia. 2004. Medieval Islamic Political Thought. Edinburgh University Press.
Crone, Patricia, ‘The Pay of Client Soldiers in the Umayyad Period’, Der Islam, 80
(2003), pp. 284–300.
Dennett, D. C., Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam, Cambridge, MA , 1950
Donner, Fred M. 2016. The Early Islamic Conquests.
Dūrī, ʻAbd al-ʻAzīz. Early Islamic Institutions: Administration and Taxation from the
Caliphate to the Umayyads and ʻAbbāsids. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Friedmann, Yohanan. Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relations in the
Muslim Tradition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
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